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Law and Identity in Spatial Contests 
 
RICHARD MOHR, University of Wollongong, Australia 
 
 
Abstract Law has had a traditional reference to land, conceived as territory, in the notion of a 
jurisdiction, where the law of the land applies equally to all individuals. Recent critiques of 
this view have suggested that a plurality of laws may apply in particular places. How this 
spatial pluralism impacts on dominant views of law is considered through two instances in 
which law has interacted with competing conceptions of place and territory in relations 
between European and Indigenous Australians. Space, law and identity are seen to constitute 
each other in complex forms. Indigenous beliefs and practices challenge the claims to 
universality of Western conceptions of law and space deriving from Roman law and spatial 
practices. 
 
Laws, Space and Identities 
 
This article discusses interactions between Indigenous and European Australians in relation to 
land, law and identity. I have selected two instances which each offer a useful counterpoint to 
dominant, and perhaps taken for granted, notions of geopolitical space. According to a 
traditional view of political authority, we are bound by the laws of the nation-state because the 
state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence is backed by the authority of the law of the 
land. State violence is used to enforce the law. That law applies throughout the spatial extent of 
the nation, so that the jurisdiction of the law is conterminous with the borders of the state. 
Everyone within those borders is equally subject to the law’s jurisdiction and, at least those 
who are citizens of the state, enjoy the same legal rights. This ‘equality before the law’ is a 
foundation of the legitimacy of the modern state. 
 We know, of course, that identities are more layered and differentiated than this simple 
view would have it. Claims to legal rights may be based on certain notions of identities which 
have not, hitherto, been legally recognised. These very claims may then both define rights and 
reconstruct identities. The interactions between law and space are just as fluid and mutually 
constitutive as are those between law and identity. The abstract notion of legal persons, 
enjoying the same rights and equal before the law, is a convenient liberal fiction. In the same 
way, the notion of homogeneous legal space of jurisdiction is a two-dimensional map of a far 
more patterned, layered and variable set of interactions. Both these notions — of homogeneous 
legal space and of equal individuals before the law — are challenged in the instances cited in 
this article. 
 Both these instances involve conflict over space and the way it is represented and used 
in the historical context of colonisation and Aboriginal resistance in contemporary Australia. 
One of these looks at Aboriginal land law and its intersection with European law in relation to 
land claims, with special attention paid to a claim in the Kimberley, in the north of Western 
Australia. The other considers continuing efforts to colonise the frontiers of northwestern New 
South Wales by applying specific laws to particular spaces. Both involve the origins, 
development and consequences of particular laws: the Native Title Act 1994 (Cth) and the 
Local Government (Street Drinking) Amendment Act 1990 (NSW). Different groups use space 
as a terrain of action in struggles over interests and hegemony. These struggles may be direct 
and physical or may involve patterns of daily life in space, as well as competing social 
representations of space. Law is among these representations. 
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Plurality and Determinacy in Legal Spaces 
 
The project of developing a common law of the land (known in Roman law as a ‘lex terrae’), 
applying throughout the nation rather than to individuals as group members, was introduced as 
the law of the Norman Kings in England. It was to become one of the hallmarks of the modern 
state. Boaventura de Sousa Santos refers to this as the process of homogenisation of law within 
a territory.1 For Max Weber, it is typical of the process of rationalisation involved in the move 
from diverse ‘special laws’ based on group membership to compulsory membership in the 
state. Weber describes it as ‘[t]he ever-increasing integration of all individuals and all fact-
situations into one compulsory institution which today, at least, rests in principle on formal 
“legal equality” …’.2 
 This connection between territory, exclusive jurisdiction and formal equality among 
individuals is characteristic of a modern view of law and its locus in the nation-state. Recently 
that view of law has been criticised by writers who question law’s determinacy and who 
espouse forms of legal pluralism. Desmond Manderson sees a natural connection between legal 
pluralism and legal geography since, ‘[i]n its simplest form, pluralism posits that more than 
one legal order inhabits the same physical territory’.3 However, the very concept of a ‘legal 
order’ foreshadows Manderson’s critique of many pluralists who see the law as overly 
determined and objectivist. Both Manderson and Peter Fitzpatrick seek to overcome this 
determinism by reference to the various spaces where laws operate, admitting multiple 
interpretations of law within indeterminate social spaces. However, they take rather different 
approaches to this task. Manderson sees the mutually constitutive spheres of law and space 
creating an opening for indeterminacy which he imports from critical legal studies. Fitzpatrick, 
on the other hand, finds that modern law grounds itself in the land as a means of fixing its 
determinacy to the ‘existential imperative’ of space.4 To the extent that law can be seen to be 
coterminous with territory, Fitzpatrick suggests that this offers an argument for, or at least 
advances ideologically, the determinacy of law. Fitzpatrick sees a prime example of this link 
between law and territory in imperial law’s reliance on agriculture as the sine qua non of land 
claims to assert priority over indigenous peoples.5 
 In countering the claims of legal determinacy, both Manderson and Fitzpatrick insist 
that territory or space is not so determinate that it provides law with any fixed points. Space 
itself is seen to be fluid, neither de-territorialised by the social, nor determinately constructed 
by it.6 Both criticise that otherwise radical pluralist, Santos, for his neat separation of the local, 
national and transnational operations of law into different levels, which Manderson regards as 
reification.7 Fitzpatrick criticises Santos’s presumption of the compatibility of the local legal 
claims of indigenous peoples with the sovereignty of the nation-state and an international order 
of human rights. He turns back on Santos, as an echo of the latter’s ‘primordial’ attachments of 
indigenous peoples to the land, the equally primordial construction of the nation-state’s 
‘exclusive attachment to “blood and soil” and its universal and exclusive assertion’.8 Far from 
fitting neatly one inside the other, Colin Perrin has shown that dual demands for indigenous 
peoples to belong both to a ‘first nation’ and a nation-state create an impossible excess which 
betrays the nation-state’s own anxiety over blood and soil.9 
 In these projections of law onto the land, we also see ways in which geography and 
conceptions of space may reflect back into law. As I will demonstrate below, different views of 
the landscape or the nature of the space of a particular geographical area open up different legal 
possibilities. Different laws may apply to different places, whether these are defined as nations 
or as the spaces of local communities, as Santos would have it. Beyond this, different people 
may apply different interpretations or different conceptions of the law within the same space, 
according to Manderson. Alternative legal constructions of space redefine people by their 
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relationship to land. The laws that constitute space and identity are not monolithic, but 
themselves derive from social relations of identity and links to land. 
 Western law may define land as ‘cultivated land’, ‘terra nullius’ or ‘occupied territory’ 
based on alternative legal interpretations of the space in question. Each of those descriptions of 
a geographical area implies a different view of the identity of the people in it: industrious, 
negated or subdued. We may also see in these conceptions the idea of the inhabitants as being 
in some way constitutive of the geographical character of the land. People may be seen to use 
the land, or not; to own the land, or not; and the notion of an occupying force immediately tells 
us of a boundary between the social identities of colonised and colonising peoples. 
 I will show, in this investigation, ways in which law and geography can be constructed 
in order to define and redefine identities and to advance the claims of certain groups at the 
expense of others. It is clear that space and landscape are used and conceived by different 
people in different ways, and that social or national identities commonly draw on ties to land or 
conceptions of spatially organised social relationships.10 In the studies that follow we will see, 
within a colonial context, contested conceptions of land and its relationship to laws. Land or 
geographical space may be represented in different ways, used in different ways and defined as 
having different characteristic features by different groups.11 These representations, uses and 
features arise out of social practices and may invoke legal definitions of social relations or 
relations to the land. 
 Geographical and legal identities are thus brought to the fore symbolically and 
regulated in practice through relationships between land, laws and peoples. While laws may 
define spaces as property, national jurisdiction, or a portion of land for which a particular clan 
is responsible, space in turn provides laws with a medium, as the platform of its ritual12 and 
the extension of its authority. Identity, too, relies on a range of spatial referents, while laws 
define the bearers of identities as the bearers of particular rights. The instances that follow, and 
my subsequent analysis of them, are intended to cast light on those recent debates among legal 
theorists who, since Weber, have questioned the territorial exclusivity and legal determinacy of 
the nation-state. 
 
Native Title 
 
The first of these instances is the Ngurrara Native Title Claim lodged by four language groups 
over 75,000 square kilometres of Crown land in the Great Sandy Desert of northwestern 
Australia. The story of this claim became well known because it was supported by an 8_10 
meter painting that was the result of a collaboration between artists from the Walmajarri, 
Wongkajunka, Mangala and Juwaliny groups, which are joint claimants: 
 
We’re painting so that the non-Aboriginal people from far away, from the city can see that 
our claim is true. This place is a long way from town in the sandhills desert. There’s no 
rivers here, it’s billabong country. It’s a big country, with sandhills. We’re painting the 
living waterholes; we are painting them all in one painting, so that the government can look 
at it, and so that the non-Aboriginal people see whether it’s true what we’re painting.13 
 
The painting was presented as evidence to the National Native Title Tribunal. It weaves 
together the law and knowledge of traditional custodians from each of the language groups to 
provide a map of the subject area, so it represents the land and its law. The painting provided a 
link between the topographical representation of a Western map and the oral tradition of the 
claimant people. In this way, they could describe their attachment to the land by reference to 
the places depicted in the painting, linking those to points on the map for a European reference. 
Reference to different places elicited descriptions of land use and care, and songs referring to 
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the relationships between these places.14 In this and other paintings by people of the central 
Australian deserts, the symbols work in several dimensions. On the one hand, a symbol such as 
a circle represents a point on the surface of the land. It also represents events and particularly 
the activity of ancestor beings who may have emerged from or re-entered the earth at this 
point. In this way, the points on the painting refer to actual places and also to the stories 
connected with those places. Furthermore, the stories and the connections between those stories 
refer to groups of people (e.g., clans whose totem is the subject of the story), and the 
connections between places, can also refer to the connections between different groups.15 
Tracks and sites have their own custodians, and are specific to particular rituals.16 The law of 
land custody and sacred sites is illustrated by these paintings, which have been developed, 
using modern materials such as acrylic paints on canvas, out of diagrams, bark paintings, oral 
traditions and shared mental maps. 
 Australian lawyers and others can relate the places of paintings to places as they are 
represented through a map. A simple relationship of identity between places can be established 
by comparing paintings with maps. However, the meaning of these places is not conveyed 
across cultures with the location. The place where an ancestor stopped on a journey and left 
some mark has a different significance to the initiated traditional owner than the one which the 
same place has for the naive traveller equipped with a map. In a similar way, the law of the 
land that can be deciphered by an Aboriginal initiate is in no way the same as that which is 
imagined by a common law judge. Again, although the places may be the same, the 
relationships — of ownership, custodianship, shared care or pastoral lease — cannot be 
mapped onto the place using the same set of cultural referents. 
Aboriginal occupation and law of the land remained invisible to the law of the 
colonisers until the Mabo case in 1992.17 While Indigenous communities were using the land 
for sustenance, ritual and as the foundation of their origin stories and cosmology, the colonisers 
maintained the fiction of terra nullius — that the land was not owned by anyone and thus 
available for appropriation — for two hundred years. The clash between Indigenous inhabitants 
and colonisers was played out at the level of representation as well as use of the land. 
Indigenous representations, like the canvas described here, convey a rich picture of a land that 
is used and meaningful. The opposing trope of the colonial society was to see the land as 
unimproved and uncomprehended. European law has placed particular importance on land care 
and cultivation, its absence or presence being a touchstone of land rights18 from early white 
settlement to the Mabo decision. In the first Australian Indigenous land rights case to come to 
court in 1970, Justice Blackburn referred to Emer de Vattel’s eighteenth-century view that it 
was the obligation of civilised people to cultivate the land.19 Peter Fitzpatrick has linked this 
view to the colonial origins of the notion of property20 and to the distinction of the sovereign 
nation-state ‘from its savage contrary’ — a land inhabited by nomads without a right of 
possession.21 To the extent that this doctrine has been overturned within Australian common 
law, it has been as a result of changed representations of space and land use, and not as a result 
of changing patterns of practice. Native title decisions must take account of Aboriginal 
representations of space expressed in law, ceremony and social relationships.22 
Australian law now recognises that membership of a group, such as an Aboriginal 
language group or a group of traditional custodians, may be the basis of land rights. As will 
become clearer, definitions of group membership and relationships to land may vary between 
Indigenous and common law. At the same time, the connection to the land establishes those 
rights. Under Aboriginal law, the relationship to the land defines group membership as well as 
the identity deriving from skin and totem relationships. The legal system that establishes these 
relationships is founded upon a cosmogony which can still be read from the land, and which is 
interpreted through stories and paintings. In these ways, people and groups are connected to the 
land, through identity and law. The land is the bearer of the law and the social relationships 
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which define law and identity are inscribed on the land through stories and images. These 
‘maps’ of identity and law recognise and reinforce complex social relationships within specific 
territories.  
Subsequent developments in the Ngurrara claim illustrate some of the difficulties 
described by Luke McNamara and Scott Grattan in expecting Indigenous group formation and 
relationships to land to conform to a common law model, even one which purports to recognise 
‘native title’.23 Following lodgement of a claim by another group, the Martu people, to an area 
called ‘Warla’ or the Percival Lakes district, adjoining and partially within the Ngurrara claim 
area, agreement was reached between the groups to excise Warla from the Ngurrara claim. The 
difficulties of forcing Indigenous conceptions of land tenure into the confused and shifting 
framework of the Native Title Act (NTA) are described in an interlocutory judgement of the 
Federal Court. The Ngurrara and Martu claimants agreed, in 1999, that the Ngurrara would 
drop their claim over the Warla area and the Martu would include Ngurrara claimants in their 
claim to that area. One of the claims was amended, the other was not, and the judge noted that: 
‘The Ngurrara claimants have been advised to restore the Warla land to the area of the 
Ngurrara claim.’24 
The overlapping and complementary responsibilities for land in Aboriginal laws define 
the relationships between land and people in ways which are extremely difficult to reduce to 
the singular and exclusive claims required under the Native Title Act. Further on in this 
discussion, I consider how Western laws and spatial conceptions characteristically define land 
within exclusive boundaries and unambiguous coordinates. 
 
Alcohol Free Zones 
 
A different chapter in the history of relationships between Indigenous Australians and white 
colonisers illustrates another type of relationship between law, land and identity. In this case, 
the land in question is legally defined by dominant white civic groups, ostensibly within a 
rational and egalitarian framework. As we will see, however, identity is mapped off the land in 
different ways. The distinction between the ideology of racial equality within a neutral space, 
and the practical impact of these laws on different people, provide useful clues to a different 
type of mapping between identity, law and land. 
In 1988, a number of local government councils in northwestern New South Wales took 
a new step in their attempts to control Aborigines in the towns. In this relatively remote area in 
the semi-arid inland of Australia’s first settled and most populous state, notwithstanding the 
long period of contact between Aboriginal and European Australians, there is a substantial 
minority of Aboriginal people in towns such as Bourke and Walgett. In December 1988, the 
Bourke Shire Council passed a resolution prohibiting the consumption of alcohol on certain 
public streets in the town. Those streets happened to be outside hotels where the Aboriginal 
community usually drank. This was regarded by the council as within their powers under 
section 249, headed ‘Care control and management of roads’, of the Local Government Act 
1919. 
Local government in Australia has no constitutional standing, and operates purely 
under state legislation. It has no police personnel or powers. Apart from various functions such 
as the care of roads and broad public health provisions mainly relating to cleanliness and 
rubbish removal, it has mainly developed its regulatory powers in relation to development and 
building applications. 
The year after the Bourke resolution, the Minister for Local Government (NSW) wrote 
to the council citing the conflicting opinions of a barrister and of the Crown Solicitor, and 
expressing concerns over this use of the Local Government Act: 
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While I appreciate that the problems for which controls are sought are ones of genuine 
concern to the community, I do not consider that the Local Government Act and 
Ordinances thereunder are the appropriate legislation to control the social problem of 
drunkenness or be the basis for attempting to control any other social aspect of human 
behaviour.25 
 
The Minister pointed out that police already had powers under other Acts to take action on 
‘loitering, abusive language and drunkenness’. However, councils throughout the state, led by 
those in the northwest, supported the idea of ‘Alcohol Free Zones’, and in 1990 these were 
enabled by section 644 of the Local Government (Street Drinking) Amendment Act. 
Guidelines to that Act limited the duration of the zones, and required councils to consult 
relevant community and ethnic groups who may be affected by the zones. 
Spatial contests over the use of Aboriginal land, or ‘public space’, such as those played 
out in the development of the alcohol free zone legislation, have a long history in New South 
Wales. Aboriginal communities survived across Australia despite imposition of a foreign law 
which denied their existence, and the occupation of the land by ‘police who were seen to be 
dealing with criminal violations of English law rather than acting as the armed forces of British 
imperialism’.26 Colonial policies, which continued under the Commonwealth of Australia for 
most of the twentieth century, focused on the removal of Aborigines from traditional lands, 
where those were required for farming or other ‘European’ purposes. 
The main sites of conflict have been Aboriginal reserves (those places set aside to contain 
Aborigines) and the streets of towns and cities. The reserves were designated ‘public places’ 
under the Offences in Public Places Act 1979 (NSW), which allowed aggressive policing of 
this space and deprived Aboriginal communities of any place of privacy from white 
supervision.27 An English definition of ‘public space’ was legally applied to these areas in 
conflict with Aboriginal conceptions of the space in which they lived. 
In towns, notably those of western New South Wales, conflicts involving white settlers 
(represented in particular by local government councils), police and Aborigines have been 
documented since the 1930s. In the name of a particular view of public space, councils have 
applied pressure to police to ‘move on’, arrest and otherwise harass Aboriginal users of the 
streets. Brewarrina Shire Council minutes in 1935 indicated that a letter was written to the 
police requesting that: ‘All the Abos congregating at night mainly between the Hall and C. W. 
Crane’s store to be kept moving.’ Further correspondence continued over the next two years.28 
To these whites, the Aborigines are a threatening presence, conveniently targeted as causing 
abuse, drunkenness and damage to property. The streets are seen as part of the public space of 
the town in a commercial and social sense. In Bourke, public seating was removed from the 
main street where Aboriginal people congregated. Gillian Cowlishaw interviewed councillors 
involved in this decision: ‘The reason given to me by a councillor was that Aborigines sat on 
them. This explanation was quickly amended to “Too many sat on them, lounged all over 
them. It did not look nice for the tourists.” ’29 
Aboriginal residents have their own views of the streets. Much Aboriginal social life 
still occurs in the open air rather than inside private homes, and some of it involves drinking.30 
An Aboriginal woman who grew up in another western New South Wales town described her 
experience of the street in Walgett:  
 
That’s your social life — the only social life you have. On the street. So, if all your friends 
and family are on one side of the street then you cross over to talk to them. Or if that’s the 
cafe you hang out at, then you hang around to see who’s in the cafe or whatever. Or the 
Oasis Hotel is where you might see your uncle or something. You know people on that side 
of the street. On the other side of the street you just didn’t know what was happening.31 
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The alcohol free zones originated in the traditional efforts of western New South Wales 
councils to impose their hegemonic view of space by containing the Aboriginal communities of 
their areas. In recent years, the councillors have increasingly avoided specifying Aborigines as 
their target. Cowlishaw identified this trope in the justifications of leaders of the white 
community in Bourke, who said that their actions applied to all members of the community, 
‘black, white or brindle’. Instead, Aborigines can be unobtrusively targeted by applying 
regulations only to those areas where they are likely to be. By applying the alcohol free zones 
to specific areas, the councils exempted non-Aboriginal areas where the residents, including 
council officers, may wish to have street parties with their neighbours.32 They were also 
initially able to bring the regulation under their traditional jurisdiction over places and things, 
while effectively applying it to a particular group of people. 
The concept of ‘space’ employed in these justifications of selective spatial regulation 
divorces it from identification with any group. While council members and officers know quite 
well that their ordinances apply to particular areas of town, each with its particular character, 
their application to space rather than to people has the effect of disguising their social referents. 
Space is held to be a neutral medium of regulation, equal from any one part to another, colour 
blind and blind to the social reality that constitutes it. 
 
From Empty Space to Jurisdiction 
 
Negation of colonial realities has been identified by David Spurr as one of a number of tropes 
of colonial domination. Law, landscape, economies and traditional practices, uncomprehended 
by the coloniser, were negated through discourse by reference to a metropolitan yardstick. 
 
[N]egation acts as a kind of provisional erasure, clearing a space for the expansion of the 
colonial imagination and for the pursuit of desire. In this way, the structures of discourse, 
in which language is divided, subordinated and made into a working system, recapitulate 
the historical process of establishing and maintaining colonial rule.33 
 
The space of the colonies was likewise negated, seen as empty. The empty geographical space 
of the world beyond Europe was seen to be in need of ‘filling’ with cultivation, Christianity, 
law and white people. This emptiness derives from European notions of space as well as from 
the lack of comprehension of specific objects and events that were to be found in the new lands 
‘discovered’ by Europeans. As we have seen in the case of Australia, Aboriginal space is filled 
with the known and moulds the shape of space to that knowledge. European space, on the other 
hand, was founded in practice on the Roman grid system of laying out army camps, colonies 
and towns, commencing with the axes of the two coordinates, cardo (north-south) and 
decumanus (east-west).34 This practice and conceptualisation gave rise to the Cartesian 
coordinates, whereby any point in two-dimensional space can be specified by a unique set of 
two numbers. European mapmaking, so different in its representation of space from a Western 
Desert painting, is based on this system of coordinates. 
 
Once the earth’s surface was assumed as the ultimate reference of modern maps in the 
sixteenth century, the latitude-longitude grid for the entire planet was developed to 
establish a general matrix for measurement. Since then, the world has fascinated 
generations of humans by its unknown places yet to be discovered in order to fill in the 
blank squares established by the mathematical projection.35 
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Geographical expeditions from the colonising powers could map these empty spaces, and their 
navies and armies could conquer them from gunboats and garrisons. Yet ruling over the subject 
peoples, whether indigenous or colonial, was not so simple. Colonial political authority was 
introduced to these territories by means of legal and spatial constructions built upon Cartesian 
homogeneous space. A geographical sense of ‘jurisdiction’ developed in line with modern 
notions of state power and the territory of the state. This legal space, convenient for the nation-
state, was fundamental to the colonial project. 
Another European inheritance from Roman spatial ritual is seen in the space contained 
by boundaries: the walls of the town, the border of the empire.36 As we can see the origins of 
the Cartesian coordinates in the cardo and decumanus, so we can see the origins of a spatial 
conception of law’s application in this heritage of border lines. In addition, just as Cartesian 
space can map the possibility of ‘empty’ space, boundaries map the possibility that it may be 
filled with a legal regime, or what has come to be known as a ‘jurisdiction’. 
In its origins, juris dictio defined the authority to pronounce law. The jurisdiction of various 
courts — whether ecclesiastical, town, manorial or royal — overlapped spatially and depended 
upon the nature of the legal case, and the group membership or loyalty of the participants. 
Before the rise of the absolute state, the concept of ‘jurisdiction’ had a more tenuous 
relationship to space. Then, as now, law had an important role in determining land ownership. 
Rome was founded with a plough line; nomos (law) derives from the same root as pasturage in 
Greek. In turn, land ownership determined various aspects of one’s legal status. Dating back to 
the Greek polis, citizenship itself could be dependent on land ownership. Group membership 
and loyalty derived from patterns of ownership and one’s place in them, as lord, vassal or 
town-dweller. 
Through the legal formalisation of these sorts of relationships with the development of 
Western law in feudal Europe, groups were, from the beginning, the bearers of rights.37 Rights 
attach to a range of groups defined by relationships in land, membership of a community or by 
other designations of status. From its feudal origins, the space of European law was filled with 
competing and overlapping legally constituted groups, each having rights and an appropriate 
authority exercising jurisdiction. In early medieval law, ‘every man was entitled everywhere to 
be judged by that tribal law by which he “professed” to live. The individual carried his 
professio iuris with him wherever he went.’38 
This profusion of jurisdictions was gradually rationalised over several centuries into an 
increasing exclusivity in the relation of the individual to the state. This relationship of 
citizenship, initially one among many such rights-bearing group memberships, developed an 
exclusivity unknown in feudal law: lex terrae, or the law of the land. As I noted in the opening 
discussion, Weber linked territorial absolutism to the principle of formal legal equality, seeing 
both as aspects of a process of rationalisation, a process which took place over hundreds of 
years. The exclusive jurisdictional boundaries of the absolute state as a ‘compulsory 
institution’ were established before the rise of liberalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Weber linked the rise of exclusive jurisdiction within state territory with the shift of 
rights from groups to individuals and (subsequent) legal equality. 
The undifferentiated legal space of a state’s jurisdiction meets Cartesian space in the 
homogeneity of its subjects and of its space. As a template of state power, jurisdiction is 
available to roll out over the ‘empty’ colonial spaces. Since it is divorced from any connection 
to the inherent jurisdiction of specific groups, it is well suited to the purpose of a law of the 
land. The device conceived by the Norman kings to bring a common law to the peoples of 
Britain was a serviceable model for later colonial expansion. 
The liberal conception of the individual citizen as the bearer of legal rights provided the 
ideal subject of uniform spatial jurisdiction. The individual becomes a bearer of rights by virtue 
of his or her location within a territory. While citizenship rights based on place of birth have 
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maintained a remnant of those special rights which in medieval times one carried around as a 
form of group attachment, the common law of the land allocates jurisdiction over people within 
territorial borders, defining their rights by where they happen to be. 
With the development of Cartesian space, lex terrae and spatially defined jurisdiction, 
the modern state now had at its disposal a constellation of geographical, legal and social 
concepts which facilitated its domination of space and the people in it. With legal identity 
reduced to the rights of the individual abstracted from subjectivity,39 law could be laid over 
the land and its inhabitants like a map. In legal thought focused on national borders and state 
law, jurisdiction becomes abstracted from its social basis and appears alien, as the force of a 
law derived from a remote state. In this state, law defines space as jurisdiction, while the 
physical location of the abstract individual, artificially divorced from any social notion of 
identity, determines legal status. Legal status then acts as a proxy for identity, but only as a 
legal fiction. Separated from its connection with social groups — whether ethnic communities 
of origin or status groups as bearers of rights — jurisdiction linked to the compulsory state is 
seen as a homogeneous space, without seams or gaps. 
 
Law and the Terrain of Social Action 
 
In the instances of native title and alcohol free zones, we can see two conflicting views of legal 
space in contemporary Australia that help to both reiterate and deconstruct the tension between 
a lived, social space and a homogeneous space of legal authority. Native title legislation and 
the claims under that legislation bring alternative representations of the land and its significant 
features into contact with the common law. The diagrammatic representation of the land and 
stories of connection with it are juxtaposed with the Western map; the representational and 
experiential features of Aboriginal land are mapped onto and against those Western features of 
boundaries, coordinates and contour lines. 
New South Wales councils have represented the space covered by alcohol free zones as 
a homogeneous medium in which law may be applied equitably to anyone who happens to be 
in that area. This mutual constitution of particular notions of space and law is disturbed by 
counter-hegemonic or simply anomalous spatial practices. The use patterns of public space in 
towns in northwestern New South Wales recall continuity with pr e-colonial life, lived 
outdoors and without colonial restraints, while constituting an alternative spatial practice 
within the post-occupation landscape of pubs, police and local government. 
Alcohol free zones can be seen as both a relic and a metaphor of colonisation. A 
singularly conceived law can be rolled out over space, seeking to obscure legal plurality and 
diverse social realities. New South Wales local government use of these zones mimics the 
liberal equality deemed to derive from a common law of the land — lex terrae — not of any 
particular group. It suggests a universality of application, to anyone, ‘black, white, or brindle’. 
The alcohol free zones, as originally developed in western New South Wales, tried to regulate 
one particular racially defined group. Yet they did this by defining a ‘jurisdiction’, a zone, 
within which the law would appear to apply equally to all. In this way, they may be more 
acceptable to liberal notions of law, and thus survive appeal court challenges on the grounds of 
racial discrimination. While purporting to be blind to the differences between people, the 
proponents of alcohol free zones use space as a proxy for identity. Identity can thus be denied 
by linking law applied ‘equally’ to undifferentiated individuals to the selective targeting of 
space which is the lived experience and common life of people. 
Laws cannot be seen in abstraction from the social make-up of the space they regulate. 
The homogeneous public space constructed by the state, the settlers and the law during the 
nineteenth century was not quite so seamless as its representation by the spread of the courts 
and their ubiquitous Greek pediments implied. Native title, in this sketchy representation, 
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illustrates another layer of laws, both European and Aboriginal, which recognise the bonds of 
clan, kinship and culture. The Ngarrara people, representing four groups or clans, claimed an 
area over which they had responsibility. Part of that area overlapped with the Martu people’s 
area of responsibility. Negotiations led to revised ways of dealing with European law, which 
then ran into further difficulties. Space enters into a relationship with people and their laws. In 
place of the modern abstract property relationship between a legal person and a thing, we see a 
set of overlapping obligations and use rights that neither separate the relationships of land from 
people nor the people from each other.  
These more complex relationships between land, law and people also disturb the simple 
abstractions of legal personality and territorial jurisdiction, as personal and spatial identities 
that may be mapped onto each other. In the modern state, territory acts as a proxy for social 
group membership. Individual rights defined in geographic, rather than social, terms link 
people to a territorial state rather than a social group. I discussed above Weber’s view of these 
individual legal rights as an outcome of the process of rationalisation, which is also a 
rationalisation involving the abstraction of space as territory. Territory is reified space, not only 
as a proxy for social relationships, but also in its abstraction from the land, from space socially 
constructed by a diversity of groups and cultures. 
As we see in the case of alcohol free zones, application of law to a space, to a specific 
area of land, gives it the appearance of depersonalisation. Yet the law is only as homogeneous 
and depersonalised as the space and the people who live it. Both the homogeneity of space and 
the individualism of rights divorced from social context and group membership are being 
challenged by Aboriginal Australians as by many other peoples. Liberal trends are reversed to 
the extent that rights have more recently come to be associated with group membership defined 
on grounds of ethnicity, race or gender.40 The politics of identity is one manifestation of the 
fragmentation of national space and homogeneous law.41 In situations such as the former 
Yugoslavia, where we have seen militias try to force the richness of diverse identities to fit a 
two-dimensional map of nations, the horror of space as occupied territory against peoples is 
manifest.42  
The homogeneous space represented by the legal formulations of the liberal state looks 
increasingly empty in this new terrain. It is the space of jurisdictional boundaries and Cartesian 
coordinates, rather than the lived experience of social groups. Within the liberal nation-state, 
one of law’s major claims to legitimacy rests on its homogeneity. It applies equally to all. The 
equality guaranteed by space is only as fair as the equality (i.e., the genuine homogeneity) of 
that space. However, this appeal to universality is undermined by the lived reality and the 
recognition of heterogeneous, contested space. Since space is culturally defined43 it continues 
to be a site of contested legitimacies and competing interpretations. 
A particular conception of legal space purports to provide a set of mechanisms of 
legitimation that may be applied to any contest among groups. While the mechanisms of law 
operate at a high level of conceptual abstraction (e.g., legal fictions or definitions of 
jurisdiction), at another level they engage with people on the terrain of their daily lives. This is 
the terrain of our mental frameworks of right and our cognitive maps of lived space. When we 
examine the ways law is invoked and relationships are lived out in particular spaces, under 
particular legal regulations, we see that material and social space coexists with abstract 
‘territory’. Beneath the space-as-map that colonisation has rolled out, there always exists the 
space of our social lives and our moral choices.  
De Certeau has referred to space as a ‘practised place’.44 He contrasts the geometric 
street of urban planning with the transformed space of walkers. Using a different ‘geometry’, 
law has been used to define territories — from state jurisdictions to alcohol free zones — 
which walkers and drinkers, police and Aborigines, then live in and contest in their own ways. 
Co-existing, overlapping and sometimes conflicting with the abstract space of the modern 
11 
state, people live in groups and inhabit their own spaces.45 Spatial practices, including 
longstanding traditions and daily patterns of living, continue within and around the laws of 
different peoples. 
Identities are moulded by space, while we act in space to explore and reinforce those 
identities. Laws are a vital ingredient of the interaction between space and identities. Space, 
like law, has undergone many changes in historical time and social place. Long overtaken by 
the nation’s law and abstract colonising space, layers of other laws and spaces can still be 
discerned. The layered and nuanced space of feudal law and medieval space within which it 
developed has similar components to Aboriginal law and the emerging layers of legal space 
developing in contemporary Australia.46 It is part of a political, as well as an intellectual, 
project to uncover and to practise those layers of social space and law that suggest a more 
flexible and lively relationship between space and identity than a two-dimensional map of the 
monoculturalism of ethnic cleansing or the disingenuous ‘colour blindness’ of alcohol free 
zones in western New South Wales.  
By recognising the role played by space in mediating between law and identity, we see 
a range of possible relationships between people and the land they inhabit. One form of these 
relationships may be constructed by particular conceptions of law, representations of space and 
legal definitions of identity (legal persons, citizens). I have identified a cluster of relations that 
arose out of Roman and Cartesian conceptions of space and which were established in the 
practices of the nation-state and colonial expansion. By looking at the interactions between this 
set of representations and practices and those of colonised peoples, alternatives become 
apparent. This consideration of Australian laws and their application to particular spaces 
highlights the role played by identity in constituting the law and its application. In each case, 
the space to which the law applies is crucial to the interpretation of the law and the constitution 
of the identity of the protagonists. 
We have also seen spatial practices and representations that in turn define space and 
assert alternative laws and interpretations. Alternative constellations of space, law and 
identities seen in Indigenous Australian practices and representations do not fit neatly into the 
traditional European framework of modernism and the nation-state. The similarities between 
these and certain pre-modern European forms do not suggest ‘primordial’ connections between 
pre-modern societies, but rather highlight the specificity of dominant relationships of land, law 
and identity. In their specificity to a particular period and a dominant culture, these 
relationships can be seen as contingent and constantly open to challenge by alternative 
practices and representations by Indigenous people and others. 
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